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Biometric Identification in India Versus 
the Right to Privacy: Core Constitutional 
Features, Defining Citizens’ Interests,  
and the Implications of Biometric  
Identification in the United States 
MADISON JULIA LEVINE* 
In 2009, the Indian government introduced a widespread 
biometric identification system called Aadhaar—a national 
scheme that issues Indian citizens and residents a unique 
identification number while collecting and storing their most 
personal biometric and demographic information. As the 
Aadhaar system was implemented and promoted in India, 
widespread concerns grew regarding the storage and pro-
tection of such private information. How can Indian citizens 
enforce and protect their privacy rights? In 2017, the Indian 
Supreme Court attempted to address this issue by holding 
that an individual’s right to privacy is an inherent part of the 
right to life and personal liberty and is therefore implied un-
der Article 21 of the Indian Constitution. 
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Following the Supreme Court of India’s declaration that 
privacy is a fundamental right, the idea of a general-purpose 
identification database is constitutionally questionable. As 
there is no comprehensive legal framework for privacy pro-
tection and no explicit constitutional right to privacy in In-
dia, one must ask: is the Indian government violating indi-
vidual privacy rights through Aadhaar? Regardless of this 
concern, in 2018 the Indian Supreme Court declared 
Aadhaar constitutional in connection to the mandatory link-
ing of Aadhaar numbers with all government welfare 
schemes and services. In light of this decision, this Comment 
advocates that the Aadhaar system should have been deemed 
unconstitutional as a violation of individual privacy rights. 
Additionally, with the growth of interconnected technol-
ogy, it is important to address the consequences of a system 
like Aadhaar in the United States. How would a similar iden-
tification system function and would such a system even be 
deemed constitutional? To maintain a liberal democratic so-
ciety that values and upholds privacy rights, the United 
States should avoid proposing such a system, no matter how 
beneficial or convenient it may seem. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The right to privacy was characterized in the United States dur-
ing the late nineteenth century simply as the “right to be let alone.”1 
Since then, the right to privacy has expanded into something much 
greater due to—among other sociopolitical changes—emerging 
technology and information systems, which have wrought a com-
plex set of issues that illuminate the core definitional features of pri-
vacy in the twenty-first century.2 Alan Westin, a scholar who sur-
veyed and set the boundaries of privacy under the United States 
Constitution for a half-century, said that “[p]rivacy is the claim of 
individuals, groups, or institutions to determine for themselves 
when, how, and to what extent information about them is communi-
cated to others.”3 In 1989, the United States Supreme Court stated 
that privacy is one’s “control over information concerning his or her 
person.”4 Similarly, President Bill Clinton’s National Information 
Infrastructure Task Force defined privacy as “an individual's claim 
to control the terms under which personal information—information 
identifiable to the individual—is acquired, disclosed, and used.”5 By 
any definition today, privacy includes the “ability of an individual 
or a group to seclude themselves or information about themselves 
and thereby reveal themselves selectively.”6 Accordingly, the defi-
nition that will be used throughout this Comment to encompass pri-
vacy rights in the modern international system can be stated as fol-
lows: privacy is the right to control the dissemination of personal 
                                                                                                                            
  1  Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. 
REV. 193, 205 (1890). 
 2  Justice K.S. Puttaswamy (Retd.) v. Union of India (Puttaswamy I), Writ 
Petition (Civil) No. 494 of 2012, 1 (Sup. Ct. India Aug. 24, 2017) (describing 
issues such as data mining, data collection, algorithms, internet browsing, and 
online banking). A subsequent Indian Supreme Court decision was reached in 
2018 and is referred to as Puttaswamy II. 
 3  ALAN WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM 7 (1967); see Karen Sparks, Alan 
Furman Westin, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, https://www.britannica.com/biog-
raphy/Alan-Westin (last updated Dec. 14, 2018); see also Tabrez Ahmad et al., 
Right of Privacy: Constitutional Issues and Judicial Responses in USA and India, 
Particularly in Cyber Age 11 (2009) (unpublished manuscript), https://pa-
pers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1440665.   
 4  U.S. Dep’t of Justice v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 489 
U.S. 749, 763 (1989).  
 5  Ahmad et al., supra note 3, at 11.  
 6  Id. at 2.  
2019] BIOMETRIC IDENTIFICATION IN INDIA VS THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY 621 
information.  
This Comment addresses two primary questions. First, does In-
dia’s biometric identification system violate constitutional privacy 
protection? Second, what are the implications of enacting a similar 
system in the United States? There is also the related issue of what 
occurs when one cannot control the dissemination of personal infor-
mation. How will our privacy rights be protected and upheld? This 
Comment approaches these questions and issues in the context of 
India’s Aadhaar scheme—a national identification system that is-
sues Indian citizens and residents a unique ID number while collect-
ing and storing their most personal biometric and demographic in-
formation.7  
This Comment advocates for new, comprehensive privacy pro-
tections under Indian law in light of the 2017 Indian Supreme Court 
decision Puttaswamy v. Union of India (Puttaswamy I), which up-
held the right to privacy as fundamental under the Constitution of 
India.8 Part I of this Comment discusses privacy rights under the 
Indian Constitution, including previous and current case law ad-
dressing this issue. Part II explores privacy rights under the United 
States Constitution and prior jurisprudence that developed this topic, 
as well as alternative views on constitutional interpretation. Part III 
highlights the specific issues associated with Aadhaar ID cards, in-
cluding the pros and cons of the personal identification system. Part 
IV analyzes the constitutionality of current Aadhaar legislation in 
India and suggests changes in the law. Finally, Part V explores the 
implications and consequences of implementing a similar national 
identification system in the United States.  
I. CORE PRIVACY RIGHTS UNDER THE INDIAN CONSTITUTION 
Fundamental rights such as life, dignity, personal liberty, happi-
ness, and freedom arise out of societal custom and are memorialized 
in constitutions and legislation.9 Such rights have been described as 
basic, primordial, or inalienable rights and in modern democratic 
                                                                                                                            
 7  See infra Part III.  
 8  Puttaswamy I, Writ Petition (Civil) No. 494 of 2012 1, 262–63 (Sup. Ct. 
India Aug. 24, 2017; see infra Part I.  
 9  See Puttaswamy I, Writ Petition (Civil) No. 494 of 2012 at 23 (Bobde, J., 
concurring).  
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countries, cannot be “abridged or curtailed totally by ordinary legis-
lation” or the acts of elected officials.10 The framers of the Consti-
tution of India believed that liberty cannot be fully enjoyed without 
the guarantee of certain freedoms.11 The very purpose of creating a 
written Indian Constitution was to “secure justice, liberty, and 
equality to the people of India.”12  
As such, the Constitution of India contains provisions “specify-
ing and identifying certain rights” for its citizens.13 In attempting to 
understand and solidify these essential rights, it is important to look 
to the written text of the Constitution for a deeper understanding.14 
Such freedoms can be found in the words of the Preamble and Part 
III (Fundamental Rights) of the Indian Constitution, which includes 
Articles 14, 19, and 21.15 These Articles enumerate a specific and 
precise list of rights, including the following: the right to equal pro-
tection,16 freedom of speech and expression, freedom of move-
ment,17 life, and personal liberty.18 Nevertheless, an exact constitu-
tional provision containing a fundamental right of privacy is lacking, 
creating a discord of court opinions concerning the privacy rights of 
                                                                                                                            
 10  Puttaswamy I, Writ Petition (Civil) No. 494 of 2012 at 22–23 (Che-
lameswar, J., concurring).  
 11  Id. at 24.  
 12  Id.  
 13  Id. at 22.  
 14  See id. at 21. 
 15  INDIA CONST. pmbl. (“We, the People of India, having solemnly resolved 
to constitute India into a sovereign socialist secular democratic republic and to 
secure to all its citizens: Justice, social, economic, and political; Liberty of 
thought, expression, belief, faith, and worship; Equality of status and opportunity; 
and to promote among them all fraternity assuring the dignity of the individual 
and the unity and integrity of the Nation.”); id. art. 14 (“The State shall not deny 
to any person equality before the law or the equal protection of the laws within 
the territory of India.”); id. art. 19 (“All citizens shall have the right to freedom of 
speech and expression; to assemble peaceably and without arms; to form associ-
ations or unions or co-operative societies; to move freely through the territory of 
India; to reside and settle in any part of the territory of India; and to practice any 
profession, or to carry on any occupation, trade or business.”); id. art. 21 (“No 
person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty except according to proce-
dure established by law.”). 
 16  Id. art. 14. 
 17  Id. art. 19. 
 18  Id. art. 21. 
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Indian citizens.19  
However, on August 24, 2017, the Indian Supreme Court deci-
sion in Puttaswamy v. Union of India (Puttaswamy I)20 brought 
some clarity to the issue of fundamental privacy rights. Prior to Put-
taswamy I, there was a general understanding of an implied right to 
privacy in India, but its boundaries remained imprecise.21 For exam-
ple, the ancient and religious texts of India contained a well-devel-
oped sense of privacy.22 In the Ramayana (an ancient Indian epic 
poem), a woman should not be seen by a male stranger, and the Gri-
hya Sutras (sacred Hindu texts concerning domestic rituals) describe 
the correct way to build one’s home to protect privacy.23 Members 
of one particular Hindu denomination, known as the Ramanuj Sam-
pradaya, refuse to eat or drink in the presence of others.24 Despite 
the evident historical emphasis on privacy, the Court in Puttaswamy 
I solidified this legal issue by holding that an individual’s right to 
privacy is an inherent part of the right to life and personal liberty 
and therefore is implied in Article 21 of the Indian Constitution.25  
In the judgment, Justice Chandrachud declared that privacy is an 
intrinsic right to life and liberty.26 This judgment arose as a reaction 
to the overarching presence of state and private actors attempting to 
regulate individual freedoms.27 There was a need to address privacy 
                                                                                                                            
 19  Ujwala Uppaluri & Varsha Shivanagowda, Preserving Constitutive Values 
in the Modern Panopticon: The Case for Legislating Toward a Privacy Right in 
India, 5 NUJS L. REV. 21, 33, 42–44 (2012).  
 20  Puttaswamy I, Writ Petition (Civil) No. 494 of 2012.  
 21  Graham Greenleaf, Confusion as Indian Supreme Court Compromises on 
Data Privacy and ID Number, 137 PRIVACY LAWS & BUS. INT’L REP. 24, 24–26 
(2015).  
 22  Puttaswamy I, Writ Petition (Civil) No. 494 of 2012 at 21 (Bobde, J., con-
curring). 
 23  Id.  
 24  Id.  
 25  Puttaswamy I, Writ Petition (Civil) No. 494 of 2012 at 262 (majority opin-
ion) (“Privacy is a constitutionally protected right which emerges primarily from 
the guarantee of life and personal liberty in Article 21 of the Constitution.”); INDIA 
CONST. art. 21. (stating that “no person shall be deprived of his life or personal 
liberty except according to procedure established by law”.) 
 26  Puttaswamy I, Writ Petition (Civil) No. 494 of 2012 at 262–63; Right to 
Privacy a Fundamental Right, Says Supreme Court in Unanimous Verdict, WIRE 
(Aug. 24, 2017), https://thewire.in/170303/supreme-court-aadhaar-right-to-pri-
vacy/.  
 27  Puttaswamy I, Writ Petition (Civil) No. 494 of 2012 at 4–5.  
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rights in the context of the changing technological landscape of In-
dia, where the debate on privacy was “being analyzed [within] the 
context of a global information based society.”28 The task before the 
Court was to “impart constitutional meaning to individual liberty in 
an interconnected world.”29 As Justice Chelameswar stated in his 
concurring opinion, “fundamental rights are the only constitutional 
firewall to prevent [state] interference with those core freedoms con-
stituting liberty of a human being.”30 His concurrence concluded by 
emphasizing that the right to privacy is a core freedom and is part of 
the meaning of liberty within Article 21.31  
The Puttaswamy I judgment recognized the importance and 
value of privacy as a constitutional entitlement, not through the pro-
cess of amendment, but through judicial interpretation by determin-
ing the nature and the extent of the freedoms available to each per-
son protected under the Indian Constitution.32 The Court looked to 
Article 21 to interpret and establish this fundamental right.33 Justice 
Chandrachud explained that the right to privacy is implicit in the 
right to life and liberty guaranteed to citizens by Article 21 and that 
citizens have a right to safeguard that privacy.34 Justice Bobde fur-
ther expounded that the original and proper home for a right of pri-
vacy is in Article 21 at the very core of personal liberty and life it-
self.35 He stated that “[l]iberty and privacy are integrally connected 
in a way that privacy is often the basic condition necessary for ex-
ercise of the right of personal liberty.”36 Earlier in the opinion, Jus-
tice Bobde asserted that an individual must ensure his or her privacy 
in order to experience fulfillment and happiness and to perform at 
the highest level.37  
The Court also turned to the Preamble of the Indian Constitution 
                                                                                                                            
 28  Id.  
 29  Id.  
 30  Puttaswamy I, Writ Petition (Civil) No. 494 of 2012 at 40 (Chelameswar, 
J., concurring). 
 31  Id. at 40–41. 
 32  Puttaswamy I, Writ Petition (Civil) No. 494 of 2012 at 109–10 (majority 
opinion).  
 33  Id.  
 34  Id. at 51–52.   
 35  Puttaswamy I, Writ Petition (Civil) No. 494 of 2012 at 25 (Bobde, J., con-
curring).  
 36  Id. 
 37  See id. at 23.  
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in interpreting privacy as a fundamental right.38 In reference to the 
Preamble, Chief Justice Khehar explained “the constitutional vi-
sion seeks the realization of justice (social, economic and political); 
liberty (of thought, expression, belief, faith, and worship); equality 
(as a guarantee against arbitrary treatment of individuals); and fra-
ternity (which assures a life of dignity to every individual).”39 The 
principles enumerated in the Preamble exist cohesively to “facilitate 
a humane and compassionate society.”40 By focusing on human dig-
nity in realizing fundamental individual rights, the “collective well-
being of the community is determined,” ensuring that Indian society 
is a reflection of dignity, fairness, liberty, and justice.41 Chief Justice 
Khehar claimed that such reflections are also found in Article 14 
(equal protection), Article 19 (guarantees of freedom), and Article 
21 (the right to life and personal liberty) of the Constitution.42 
Justice Sapre further explored this concept, stating that the sig-
nificance of the Preamble was to focus on two aspects—first, “the 
unity of the Nation” and second, the “dignity of the individual.”43 
Both expressions are interdependent and intertwined in that the Na-
tion is required to respect the freedom and ability to attain self-ful-
fillment of every individual.44 Dignity of both the individual and the 
Nation is considered essential to the fraternity of the Indian people.45 
Justice Sapre found no difficulty in tracing the right to privacy as 
emanating from two expressions of the Preamble: “liberty of 
thought, expression, belief, faith and worship” and “fraternity assur-
ing the dignity of the individual.”46 Additionally, he also found that 
the right to privacy emanates from Article 19(1)(a), which gives to 
every citizen “a freedom of speech and expression,” Article 
19(1)(d), which gives to every citizen “a right to move freely 
                                                                                                                            
 38  INDIA CONST. pmbl. 
 39  Puttaswamy I, Writ Petition (Civil) No. 494 of 2012 at 94 (majority opin-
ion).  
 40  Id.  
 41  Id.  
 42  INDIA CONST. arts. 14, 19, 21; Puttaswamy I, Writ Petition (Civil) No. 494 
of 2012 at 94.  
 43  Puttaswamy I, Writ Petition (Civil) No. 494 of 2012 at 6 (Sapre, J., con-
curring).  
 44  Id. 
 45  Id. at 7. 
 46  Id. at 19.  
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throughout the territory of India,” and finally, from the expression 
“personal liberty” under Article 21.47 The right to privacy is inter-
twined with these expressions and “flows from each of them and in 
juxtaposition.”48 
Importantly, the Indian Supreme Court’s decision in Put-
taswamy I overruled the holdings of the 1954 case M.P. Sharma v. 
Satish Chandra and the 1962 case Kharak Singh v. State of Uttar 
Pradesh, both of which were landmark decisions holding that the 
right to privacy is not protected under the Indian Constitution.49 In 
M.P. Sharma, the Indian government seized documents belonging 
to a company suspected of falsifying records.50 Sharma challenged 
the constitutional validity of the search and seizure, claiming that it 
violated his fundamental rights under Article 19(1)(f), the right to 
acquire, hold, and dispose of property, and Article 20(3), protection 
against self-incrimination.51  The Court in M.P. Sharma held that in 
the absence of a provision similar to the Fourth Amendment of the 
United States Constitution, the right to privacy could not be read 
into the provisions of Article 20(3) of the Indian Constitution.52 Alt-
hough Article 19(1)(f) was also in question, the Court only rejected 
the right to privacy in the context of searches and seizures of docu-
ments.53 The Court took a narrow and formalistic approach, stating 
                                                                                                                            
 47  Id.  
 48  Id. at 20. 
 49  Puttaswamy I, Writ Petition (Civil) No. 494 of 2012 at 261 (majority opin-
ion); M.P. Sharma v. Satish Chandra, District Magistrate, Delhi (1954) 1 SCR 
1077, 1096–97 (India); Kharak Singh v. State of U.P., (1964) 1 SCR 332, 351 
(India). 
 50  M.P. Sharma, 1 SCR at 1079–80; Ananthakrishnan G, M P Sharma and 
Kharak Singh: The Cases in Which SC Ruled on Privacy, INDIAN EXPRESS (July 
19, 2017), http://indianexpress.com/article/explained/m-p-sharma-and-kharak-
singh-the-cases-in-which-sc-ruled-on-privacy-4756964/.  
 51  M.P. Sharma, 1 SCR at 1080–81 (discussing INDIA CONST. arts. 19, 20). 
 52  INDIA CONST. art. 20, § 3; Puttaswamy I, Writ Petition (Civil) No. 494 of 
2012 at 261; see Gautam Bhatia, State Surveillance and the Right to Privacy in 
India: A Constitutional Biography, 26 NAT’L L. SCH. INDIA REV. 127, 130 (2014).  
 53  See Bhatia, supra note 52, at 128. But see Govind v. State of M.P., (1975) 
3 SCR 946, 951–56 (suggesting that there is a zone of privacy that is protected 
under the Indian Constitution).  
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that India has no equivalent of the American Fourth Amendment’s 
specific prohibition of unlawful searches.54 
The decision in M.P. Sharma did not specifically adjudicate 
whether a right to privacy would arise from any other constitutional 
provision such as the rights guaranteed by Article 19 or Article 21.55 
The decision only held that a right to privacy cannot be read into the 
Indian Constitution under Article 20(3).56 Accordingly, the holding 
could not be interpreted to specifically exclude the protection of pri-
vacy under the framework of constitutional guarantees including 
those in Articles 19 or 21.57 M.P. Sharma left undetermined whether 
a constitutional right to privacy is protected by other provisions of 
the Indian Constitution, leaving room for future judicial interpreta-
tion.58 Therefore, in the absence of an express constitutional guar-
antee of privacy, the Court could still consider whether privacy is an 
element of personal liberty, a part of human dignity, or understood 
within the protection of human life.59  
In Kharak Singh, the petitioner challenged the constitutionality 
of police monitoring.60 After being released from custody for lack 
of evidence, the petitioner was placed under police surveillance, 
which included unannounced home visits, movement reports, and 
periodic inquiries into his communications.61 Singh challenged the 
constitutionality of the surveillance, claiming that it violated his fun-
damental rights of freedom of movement under Article 19(1)(d) and 
the protection of life an personal liberty under Article 21.62 The 
Court held that the content of the expression “life and personal lib-
erty” under Article 21 is a guarantee against intrusion into personal 
                                                                                                                            
 54  Bhatia, supra note 52, at 128; Sheetal Asrani-Dann, The Right to Privacy 
in the Era of Smart Governance: Concerns Raised by the Introduction of Bio-
metric-Enabled National ID Cards in India, 47 J. INDIAN L. INST. 53, 62 (2005).  
 55  INDIA CONST. art. 19 (protecting freedom of speech and expression, the 
ability to move freely through the territory of India, and to practice any profession, 
or to carry on any occupation, trade or business); Puttaswamy I, Writ Petition 
(Civil) No. 494 of 2012 at 262 (majority opinion).  
 56  Puttaswamy I, Writ Petition (Civil) No. 494 of 2012 at 262.  
 57  Id.  
 58  Id. 
 59  Id.  
 60  Kharak Singh v. State of U.P., (1964) 1 SCR 332, 336 (India); Anantha-
krishnan G, supra note 50. 
 61  Kharak Singh, 1 SCR at 337–39; Ananthakrishnan G, supra note 50. 
 62  Kharak Singh, 1 SCR at 336. 
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security.63 The Court further held that unauthorized entrance into a 
person’s home is a violation of that fundamental right to personal 
liberty.64 However, the Court refused to accept an infringement of 
Article 19, stating that unannounced visits did not impede Singh’s 
movements, and therefore did not abridge his personal liberty or pri-
vacy.65  
As such, the second part of the decision in Kharak Singh, which 
invalidated home visits on the ground that they violated personal 
liberty under Article 21, seems to be an implicit recognition of the 
right to privacy.66 However, the first part of the decision, emphasiz-
ing that the right to privacy is not a guaranteed right under the Indian 
Constitution, invalidates the right to privacy as a fundamental free-
dom.67  
The 2017 Supreme Court decision in Puttaswamy I,68 which di-
rectly addresses whether the right to privacy is a fundamental right 
under the Indian Constitution, overrules both M.P. Sharma and Kha-
rak Singh, creating a new stage on which to analyze and adjudicate 
privacy issues in India.  
II. THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION AND THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY 
Similar to the Indian Constitution, the United States Constitution 
does not contain an explicit right to privacy.69 However, the devel-
opment of American jurisprudence has revealed that the right to pri-
vacy is implicitly protected under several Amendments to the 
United States Constitution.70  
                                                                                                                            
 63  Id. at 348–51; Bhatia, supra note 52, at 130. 
 64  Kharak Singh, 1 SCR at 348–51. 
 65  Id. at 343–44.  
 66  Id. at 348–51; Bhatia, supra note 52, at 130.  
 67  Kharak Singh, 1 SCR at 348–51; see MP Sharma and Kharak Singh’s 
Case: ‘Privacy Not a Fundamental Right’ Supreme Court Had Held Decades 
Ago, FIRST POST (Aug. 24, 2017), http://www.firstpost.com/india/mp-sharma-and 
-kharak-singhs-case-privacy-not-a-fundamental-right-supreme-court-had-held-
decades-ago-3966467.html.  
 68  Puttaswamy I, Writ Petition (Civil) No. 494 of 2012 1, 261 (Sup. Ct. India 
Aug. 24, 2017). 
 69  Id. at 141; Uppaluri & Shivanagowda, supra note 19, at 33. 
 70  See generally Todd B. Ruback & Sarah Mahony, An Overview of Recent 
Statutory Changes to Privacy Law in India in Comparison to Similar US and EU 
Privacy Rules, N.J. LAW. MAG., Oct. 2011, at 48, 48; Uppaluri & Shivanagowda, 
supra note 19, at 34.  
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The 1965 case Griswold v. Connecticut was one of the earliest 
privacy cases before the United States Supreme Court.71 Griswold 
brought a constitutional challenge of a state law that forbade the use 
of contraceptives.72 The Court found that even though the right to 
privacy is not expressly mentioned in the Constitution, it emanates 
from the Fourth Amendment’s ban on unreasonable searches.73 The 
Court also held that the right to privacy is protected under the First, 
Third, Fifth, and Ninth Amendments.74 These Amendments create a 
zone in which privacy is protected from governmental intrusion.75  
Griswold is similar to the 1975 Indian Supreme Court case of 
Govind v. State of M.P.,76 which also recognized a “penumbra or 
zone of privacy” under the Indian Constitution.77 Govind challenged 
the constitutional validity of state surveillance and unannounced 
home visits.78 The Court held that Articles 19 and 21 of the Indian 
Constitution created an independent right to privacy and the “funda-
mental nature of [this] right is implicit in the concept of ordered lib-
erty.”79 Yet, the Indian Supreme Court did not go so far as to spe-
cifically declare privacy an inherent right, as was pronounced in 
Puttaswamy I and as the United States Supreme Court pronounced 
in Griswold, but did indicate that a fundamental privacy right could 
be overridden by a compelling state interest.80 
The 1967 decision in Katz v. United States also broadened the 
interpretation of the right to privacy in the United States Constitu-
                                                                                                                            
 71  381 U.S. 479, 480 (1965); Uppaluri & Shivanagowda, supra note 19, at 34. 
 72  Griswold, 381 U.S. at 480. 
 73  Id. at 484.  
 74  Id.  
 75  Id. at 485.  
 76  (1975) 3 SCR 946 (India). 
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tion, with specific emphasis on the Fourth Amendment and govern-
mental intrusion.81 Previous case law in the area of government sur-
veillance was based on Olmstead v. United States, which interpreted 
the Fourth Amendment to apply only to an actual physical examina-
tion of one’s person, papers, tangible effects, or home.82 However, 
as the common law notion of privacy shifted from a physical- and 
property-based understanding to a personal liberty understanding, 
there was a reexamination and reinterpretation of the Constitution, 
specifically Fourth Amendment protections.83 Katz established the 
“reasonable expectation of privacy,” illuminated in Justice Harlan’s 
concurrence, which built off Justice Stewart’s majority opinion:  
“[T]he Fourth Amendment protects people, not 
places.” The question, however, is what protection it 
affords to those people. Generally, as here, the an-
swer to that question requires reference to a “place.” 
My understanding of the rule that has emerged from 
prior decisions is that there is a twofold requirement, 
first that a person has exhibited an actual (subjective) 
expectation of privacy and, second, that the expecta-
tion be one that society is prepared to recognize as 
“reasonable.”84 
Following the Katz decision, the United States Supreme Court 
heard a number of cases to determine the extent that state actors may 
intrude upon an individual’s privacy under the Fourth Amendment. 
In Kyllo v. United States, the Court held that the thermal imaging of 
a house is a violation of the Amendment.85 Writing for the majority, 
Justice Scalia stated that the sanctity of the home is always pro-
tected, as was originally intended by the Fourth Amendment.86 
While the decision in Katz may have expanded the understanding of 
                                                                                                                            
 81  389 U.S. 347, 347 (1967); U.S. CONST. amend. IV (“The right of the people 
to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable 
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 82  277 U.S. 438, 466 (1928).  
 83  Asrani-Dann, supra note 54, at 54–55.  
 84  Katz, 389 U.S. at 516 (Harlan, J., concurring).  
 85  533 U.S. 27, 40 (2001). 
 86  Id.  
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the Fourth Amendment to include a reasonable expectation of pri-
vacy, the majority believed it did not supplant the original intention 
of the Amendment—to secure people in their “persons, houses, pa-
pers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures.”87 
In addressing the concerns with government surveillance and 
monitoring, the United States Supreme Court, in United States v. 
Jones, held that GPS monitoring of a vehicle constituted a search 
under the Fourth Amendment.88 GPS monitoring allows the govern-
ment to create a comprehensive record of a person’s public move-
ments that reflect a great amount of detail about “her familial, polit-
ical, professional, religious, and sexual association.”89 In her con-
currence, Justice Sotomayor emphasized that “physical intrusion is 
now unnecessary to many forms of surveillance” and allowing the 
government to track a vehicle’s movements through GPS may “alter 
the relationship between citizen and government in a way that is in-
imical to democratic society.”90  
Perhaps most telling of the United States Supreme Court’s view 
on surveillance and data gathering in an era of increased technology 
is the 2014 case of Riley v. California.91 There, the Supreme Court 
unanimously held that a warrantless search and seizure of digital 
contents of a cell phone was unconstitutional.92 Cell phones contain 
much more information than just a record of outgoing and incoming 
calls; they contain photographs, video tapes, address books, emails, 
bank records, browsing histories, and voicemails.93 As a result, the 
Court believed that allowing state actors to conduct a search of a 
person’s entire cell phone would be like “ransacking his house for 
everything which may incriminate him” instead of just searching his 
pockets.94 
In addition to the Fourth Amendment line of cases defining pri-
vacy, the Court developed the right to privacy in other areas as well; 
                                                                                                                            
 87  U.S. CONST. amend. IV; see Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 40.  
 88  565 U.S. 400, 412–13 (2012).  
 89  Id. at 415 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).  
 90  Id. at 416. 
 91  134 S. Ct. 2473 (2014).  
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perhaps most controversial is its decision in Roe v. Wade.95 This 
case dealt with the question of abortion and a woman’s liberty under 
the Fourteenth and Ninth Amendments.96 The Fourteenth Amend-
ment prevents the state from depriving any person of life, liberty, or 
property without due process of law, while the Ninth Amendment 
protects the unenumerated rights of the United States Constitution 
(rights that may exist aside from those explicitly mentioned).97 In 
Roe, Justice Blackmun delivered the majority opinion and held that 
[t]he Constitution does not explicitly mention any 
right of privacy. In a line of decisions, how-
ever, . . . the Court has recognized that a right of per-
sonal privacy, or a guarantee of certain areas or zones 
of privacy, does exist under the Constitu-
tion. . . . This right of privacy, whether it be founded 
in the Fourteenth Amendment’s concept of personal 
liberty and restrictions upon state action, as we feel 
it is, or, as the District Court determined, in the Ninth 
Amendment's reservation of rights to the people, is 
broad enough to encompass a woman’s decision 
whether or not to terminate her pregnancy.98 
In Roe, the Court found roots in the Constitution that protect the 
right to privacy: the First Amendment, the Bill of Rights, the Ninth 
Amendment, and the concept of liberty guaranteed by the Four-
teenth Amendment.99 This analysis is analogous to the decision in 
Puttaswamy I,100 where Article 21 of the Indian Constitution was 
interpreted to include the right to privacy under the right of life and 
personal liberty. Although the word “privacy” is not mentioned in 
either the Indian or the United States Constitutions, the courts of 
both countries have not only recognized the right to privacy under 
                                                                                                                            
 95  410 U.S. 113, 120 (1973). 
 96  Id. at 129. 
 97  U.S. CONST. amends. IX, XIV.  
 98  Roe, 410 U.S. at 152 (citations omitted). 
 99  Id. at 152–53; accord Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965). 
 100  See generally Puttaswamy I, Writ Petition (Civil) No. 494 of 2012 1, 257 
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various amendments and articles, but they have also extended the 
scope of protection under the right to privacy.101  
As demonstrated, constitutions and judicial interpretation evolve 
over time as specific issues and entitlements come to the forefront 
of the demands for justice.102 Constitutional developments have oc-
curred as constitutional texts are interpreted to address new concerns 
that require an “expansive reading of liberties and freedoms to pre-
serve human rights under the rule of law.”103  
India’s and the United States’s experiences with oppressive re-
gimes104 is a reminder of how precious the rights to life and liberty 
truly are. It is the role of the judiciary to be vigilant in interpreting 
the meaning of constitutional text, as constitutions have evolved and 
continue to evolve to meet current and future challenges.105 The 
draftsmen of both the Indian and United States Constitutions were 
influenced by a sense of history that enriched the development and 
adoption of the documents.106 Further, as seen in previously men-
tioned case law, the concept of fundamental rights, such as the issue 
of privacy intertwined with liberty and dignity, has evolved over the 
course of constitutional history in both countries.107  
Still, no past generation could possibly foresee the many prob-
lems that contemporary societies face, even with a rich sense of his-
torical understanding of the meaning of life and liberty.108 There-
fore, constitutions should be interpreted with flexibility instead of 
limiting their meanings to the confines of their drafting date.109 As 
Chief Justice Khehar eloquently put it, “above all, constitutional in-
terpretation is but a process in achieving justice, liberty, and dignity 
                                                                                                                            
 101  See Roe, 410 U.S. at 152; Uppaluri & Shivanagowda, supra note 19, at 33. 
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british/empire_seapower/american_revolution_01.shtml (last updated Feb. 17, 
2011).  
 105  See Puttaswamy I, Writ Petition (Civil) No. 494 of 2012 at 208.  
 106  Id. at 111–12. 
 107  See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152–53 (1973); see also Katz v. United 
States, 389 U.S. 347, 348 (1967); Bhatia, supra note 52, at 130.  
 108  See Puttaswamy I, Writ Petition (Civil) No. 494 of 2012 at 208–09. 
 109  See id.  
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to every citizen.”110 Therefore, as society evolves, so must constitu-
tional doctrine. 
This is particularly relevant where judicial interpretation is in-
fluenced by a technological age that has the ability to reshape our 
primary understanding of “information, knowledge, and human re-
lationships that was unknown even in the recent past.”111 As new 
challenges to privacy arise, courts must leave room for interpreta-
tion; today’s problems “have to be adjudged by a vibrant application 
of constitutional doctrine and cannot be frozen by a vision suited to 
a radically different society.”112 Technological growth is so rapid 
that it renders advances of a few years ago obsolete.113 The only way 
to maintain a relevant and applicable constitution is to view it as a 
living instrument capable of reinterpretation and reevaluation by ap-
plying the principles on which it was founded in light of societal 
change.  
III. INDIA’S AADHAAR SYSTEM: A SPECIFIC PRIVACY ISSUE   
A. The Aadhaar System  
The need for additional legal analysis of privacy rights is evident 
with the growth and development of technology, which has created 
new mechanisms for the possible invasion of privacy by the state, 
such as “surveillance, profiling, and data collection.”114 Countries 
are increasing their use of technology in light of “global terrorist 
attacks and heightened public safety concerns.”115 Digital footprints 
and wide-ranging data can be analyzed to reveal “patterns, trends, 
and associations, especially relating to human behavior and interac-
tions.”116 Along with these advancements in technology come new 
concerns of how such sensitive information is going to be dissemi-
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nated and processed by the government, especially as engineers de-
velop more effective algorithms and greater computational 
power.117  
At the forefront of the data collection debate is the Aadhaar card. 
Initiated in 2009, Aadhaar is a twelve-digit number issued by the 
Unique Identification Authority of India (“UIDAI”) to Indian resi-
dents.118 Any individual, regardless of age or social status, may reg-
ister for an Aadhaar number free of charge.119 The applicant must 
provide demographic information (name, date of birth, age, gender, 
address, mobile number, and email) and biometric information (fin-
gerprints, iris scan, and facial photograph).120  
Aadhaar is a “strategic policy tool for social and financial inclu-
sion, public sector delivery reforms, managing fiscal budgets, [in-
creasing] convenience and [promoting] hassle-free people-centric 
governance [that] facilitates financial inclusion of the underprivi-
leged and weaker sections of the society.”121 One of Aadhaar’s goals 
is to create a national identity system that can work across state, lan-
guage, and database barriers, giving an identity to the most margin-
alized and vulnerable of populations.122 Millions of impoverished 
Indian citizens lack governmentally recognized identities, prevent-
ing them from gaining access to cell phones, lines of credit, bank 
accounts, or government aid.123 With an Aadhaar ID, those lacking 
identification are now able to directly apply for housing subsidies, 
healthcare, and food through bank account deposits.124 Aadhaar can 
be used in the delivery of food, employment, education,125 social 
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 118  About Aadhaar, UIDAI, https://uidai.gov.in/your-aadhaar/about-aadhaar. 
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security, bank accounts,126 or healthcare, by allowing the agency or 
service provider to contact the central Unique Identification data-
base to confirm a beneficiary’s identity.127 To date, 1.09 billion peo-
ple across India have obtained an Aadhaar identity.128 
B. Pros of the Aadhaar System  
One of Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s policy goals is 
to extend Aadhaar to every Indian citizen as a method to prove his 
or her identity and access governmental and financial services.129 
The Aadhaar system will benefit the poorest members of Indian so-
ciety by providing direct access to government services such as food 
grains, cash subsidies, employment wages, education, health bene-
fits, or LPG (cooking fuel) distribution.130 Direct distribution will 
eliminate the problem of corrupt middlemen who enter false names 
into welfare databases to collect money intended for the poor.131 The 
poor, who often lack identifying paperwork, such as proof of address 
or birth certificates, will now be able to apply for telecom services 
and passports, facilitating movement and communication through-
out the country.132 As a result, people living at the bottom of the 
socio-economic pyramid can participate in the marketplace and en-
joy the benefits of having a government identity.133  
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Additionally, Aadhaar cards will facilitate banking and entrepre-
neurial endeavors.134 UIDAI will be able to secure money transac-
tions through MicroATMs and mobile phones in rural areas of In-
dia.135 Banks will be able to link their permanent account numbers 
with Aadhaar numbers, making it easier for people to open bank ac-
counts without extensive identity documentation.136 Linking one’s 
bank account with Aadhaar can help to ensure direct and transparent 
transfers of subsidies, weed out false beneficiaries, and reduce tax 
evasion.137  
Aadhaar can provide a secure and reliable authentication service 
for companies and entrepreneurs to facilitate market transactions.138 
For example, Aadhaar users are able to pay for goods with their fin-
gerprint or ID numbers.139 The Indian Central Bank has introduced 
outposts in rural grocery stores and other small business opera-
tions.140 Merchants at these outposts are equipped with smartphones 
and small fingerprint scanners that link their bank accounts to their 
Aadhaar numbers.141 Customers enter their Aadhaar number and 
bank name into the smart phone and then scan one of their fingers.142 
After authentication, the amount owed is directly credited to the 
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merchant’s bank account.143 This form of payment will not only fa-
cilitate commerce in rural areas, but will also assist farm workers 
and merchants in entering the formal banking system, helping them 
develop their credit history and allowing them to apply for loans.144  
C. Cons of the Aadhaar System 
This large-scale, centralized collection, storage, and use of an 
individual’s demographic and biometric information has serious pri-
vacy implications, especially considering that India lacks any type 
of comprehensive privacy law or independent oversight agency.145 
Many fear that having one universal ID number will allow govern-
ment or private actors to discover sensitive demographic and bio-
metric information.146 In fact, there have already been incidents of 
hacking the UIDAI system and stealing Aadhaar infor-
mation.147Anonymous sellers having been using the WhatsApp mo-
bile application to provide unrestricted access to information from 
more than one billion Aadhaar numbers.148 For a fee of 500 Rupees 
(around eight U.S. dollars), anyone can gain access to an individ-
ual’s name, address, date of birth, photo, personal identification 
number, phone number, and email address.149 Once Aadhaar infor-
mation is obtained, hackers use the numbers to print duplicate 
Aadhaar cards to link SIM cards and bank accounts of unsuspecting 
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users, most likely leading to identity theft.150 Ironically, Aadhaar 
was developed by the government as a method to combat corruption 
and prevent false identification and fraud.151 
Despite the recent hacking incidents,152 UIDAI continues to 
claim that biometric information is encrypted at the source and “un-
authorized sharing and leakage of the data does not happen.”153 
UIDAI denied the media reports of any information hacking, stating 
the news articles were a “case of misreporting” and claiming that 
“Aadhaar data, including biometric information, is fully safe and se-
cure.”154 UIDAI claims that having access to someone’s Aadhaar 
number does not pose a threat because an individual’s iris or finger-
prints are also necessary for successful identification;155 a mere dis-
play of demographic information cannot be misused without bio-
metrics.156 However, this has been shown to be untrue, as identity 
fraud is still occurring without the need for biometric authentica-
tion.157 Conmen can print duplicate ID cards to use at airports or 
withdraw funds by linking bank accounts with Aadhaar numbers or 
phone numbers.158 Despite UIDAI’s denial of data hacking, the re-
cent media reports regarding Aadhaar bring to light the issue of data 
security as an aspect of privacy rights and may hinder UIDAI’s goal 
of extending Aadhaar to every Indian citizen.159  
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UIDAI claims to protect users and their information160 by 
providing a secure and encrypted database, providing strict security 
and storage protocols, penalizing anyone who tampers with data or 
gains unauthorized access, and collecting limited data (no infor-
mation concerning religion, caste, community, class, ethnicity, in-
come, or health is collected).161 However, there is little legal frame-
work in India to protect Aadhaar users from data breaches.162 Be-
cause there are no comprehensive privacy laws in India, the activi-
ties of the state are regulated through “sector-specific laws and the 
jurisprudential development of the right to privacy.”163  
The only effective legislation governing security and cyber-
crime in India is the Information Technology (Amendment) Act, 
2008.164 The sole provision addressing the privacy of personal in-
formation is section 72A, which “prescribes a penalty for breach of 
privacy of an electronic record, but only applies to authorities exer-
cising power under the Act,” not to private individuals who may 
gain access to information illegally.165 Section 43 of the Information 
Technology Act requires that corporations maintain “reasonable se-
curity practices and procedures,” defined as procedures intended to 
protect information from “unauthorized access, damage, use, modi-
fication, disclosure or impairment.”166 However, the Information 
Technology Act gives corporations the freedom to determine which 
procedures they will implement in protecting confidential infor-
mation, which may lead to the use of minimum data protection 
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standards and lack of third-party oversight.167 As discussed, there 
are many cons to the Aadhaar system not just in its existence, but 
also in its application to the right to privacy.  
IV. CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE AADHAAR SYSTEM  
As there is no comprehensive legal framework for privacy pro-
tection and no explicit constitutional right to privacy in India,168 one 
must ask: is the Indian government violating individual privacy 
rights through Aadhaar? Following the Supreme Court of India’s 
declaration that privacy is a fundamental right,169 the idea of a gen-
eral-purpose identification database is constitutionally questiona-
ble.170 Determining privacy as a constitutionally protected right has 
laid the foundation for more specific challenges to  
various architectural and implementational aspects 
of Aadhaar, and its impact on privacy—such as the 
mandatory collection of biometric data, deployment 
of private players for collection of information, 
online authentication and the extent of authentication 
data storage, and the possibility of data convergence 
and profiling as a result of Aadhaar-seeding of vari-
ous databases.171 
A. The Aadhaar Act 2016 
The Aadhaar Act 2016 (“the Act” or “the Aadhaar Act”), a 
money bill passed by the Parliament of India, aims to provide legal 
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backing to the Aadhaar project.172 The Act describes the Aadhaar 
enrollment process, authentication procedures, the organizational 
structure of UIDAI, methods for the protection of information, and 
offenses and penalties.173 The Act places UIDAI in charge of secur-
ing identity information, authenticating records, and implementing 
“appropriate technical and organisational security measures.”174 
There are restrictions in place that regulate the sharing of infor-
mation with third parties, with an exception for the disclosure of in-
formation “made in the interest of national security.”175  
However, the Act was met with controversy, as section 7 speci-
fies that the government may “require” an individual to enroll in 
Aadhaar to obtain government subsidies or services.176 For example, 
a 2016 finance bill has made Aadhaar mandatory for filing tax re-
turns and obtaining a permanent bank account number.177 The In-
dian Supreme Court has directed that Aadhaar cannot be compul-
sory for beneficiaries or as a precondition to access welfare pro-
grams.178 Initially, the Aadhaar project was presented to the public 
as a voluntary program;179 however, Aadhaar has now become man-
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datory for an ever-widening range of services such as salary pay-
ments, pensions, school enrollment and scholarships, filing income 
tax returns, and other welfare schemes.180  
Nevertheless, the Indian Supreme Court has pushed against 
making Aadhaar mandatory for certain services.181 Specifically, 
there are currently a handful of petitions challenging the govern-
ment’s decision to make Aadhaar cards mandatory for government 
services and welfare schemes, claiming the mandatory linking of 
Aadhaar numbers to bank accounts and cell phones is illegal and 
unconstitutional.182 On September 26, 2018, the Indian Supreme 
Court ruled on some of these petitions, declaring the mandatory 
linking of Aadhaar numbers with all government welfare schemes 
and services to be constitutional, while linking Aadhaar numbers 
with private services such as bank accounts, employee pension 
plans, or cell phone SIM cards cannot be a requirement.183 Similar 
to a 2015 interim order where the Indian Supreme Court struck down 
the mandatory requirement of Aadhaar for private services,184 the 
2018 judgment will restrict Aadhaar’s mandatory usage to govern-
ment services only.185  
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B. Information Collection and the Legality of the Aadhaar Act  
A primary concern is that the requirement of Aadhaar will result 
in mass surveillance by the government, possibly leading to 
breaches of confidentiality and privacy.186 An identity scheme that 
employs mass surveillance impairs an individual’s autonomy and 
self-development and violates the constitutional protection of pri-
vacy and human dignity.187 There is no telling how the Indian gov-
ernment will handle such information or the political and personal 
consequences of government misuse of such large quantities of per-
sonal data.188 
As Justice Chandrachud explained in Puttaswamy I, “informa-
tional control empowers the individual to use privacy as a shield to 
retain personal control over information pertaining to the person.”189 
As per his opinion, information can be collected subject to three re-
quirements: (1) legality—there should be the existence of law; (2) 
need—the aim of the law for which information is being collected 
is reasonable; and (3) proportionality—“the means which are 
adopted by the legislature are proportional to the object and needs 
sought to be fulfilled by the law.”190  
It is essential to analyze these requirements in relation to the 
Aadhaar Act. As previously discussed, section 7 of the Act states 
that in order to establish identity as a “condition for receipt of a sub-
sidy, benefit or service,” the central or state government may “re-
quire that such an individual undergo authentication, or furnish 
proof of possession of an Aadhaar number.”191 This provision opens 
the door for the government to require Aadhaar registration for ben-
eficiaries, which the Supreme Court has already pushed against.192  
Additionally, the Act was passed in Parliament as a money bill 
(a draft law that contains provisions concerning the regulation of a 
tax, lending money to the Government of India, or withdrawal of 
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money from the Consolidated Fund of India), which has been chal-
lenged as unconstitutional because the Act contains provisions un-
related to government taxation and expenditure.193 This leads us to 
question Justice Chandrachud’s first requirement—is the Act even 
legal?194 According to the recent September 2018 Indian Supreme 
Court decision in Puttaswamy II, it is.195 In the judgment, the Court 
declared that Aadhaar could legally be brought in as a money bill.196  
Nevertheless, it is essential to consider the Act’s need and pro-
portionality, which are directly related to requirements two and 
three. While the aim of the Act is a reasonable one—to provide 
every Indian with a unique identity number that enables a fair and 
equitable distribution of benefits and subsidies—the use of bio-
metric information is not a reasonable means of data collection. 
Along with being unreasonable, the means of data collection are not 
proportional to the object or needs of the law.  
C. Biometric Data Collection 
Biometric information is the collection of data that is intrinsic to 
each person, such as fingerprints, retina scans, voice analysis, DNA 
analysis, or facial recognition.197 The appeal of biometric infor-
mation is that it is hard to falsify; however, there are serious con-
cerns on the efficacy of biometric analysis.198 The technology is not 
foolproof—any biometric authentication process is prone to error.199 
For example, manual laborers may encounter problems with finger-
print scanning, as their hands may be worn or change over time.200 
In fact, fingerprint scanning has a false rejection rate of eleven per-
cent (11%).201  
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Because biometric schemes are expensive, there is a greater ten-
dency towards data sharing among organizations, leading to a larger 
interconnected web of personal information.202 Even though other 
countries have implemented successful ID card schemes, most do 
not use biometric identifiers or have multiple applications.203 UIDAI 
can still reach its goal of creating a database of every Indian citizen 
with the use of demographic information. Other options include 
storing biometric information on an offline terminal, where the in-
formation is not stored in a single centralized online database, or 
using smartcards, where biometric information is kept directly on 
the card itself.204 These alternatives present fewer security concerns 
and are more reasonable methods of data collection and storage.205 
D. Constitutional Challenge Analysis 
Contrary to the Indian Supreme Court’s findings in Puttaswamy 
I and II, the Aadhaar system is unconstitutional and a violation of 
privacy rights. Informational privacy is a facet of the right to pri-
vacy.206 While there exists a sensitive balance between individual 
interests and legitimate concerns of the state, the Indian government 
would have a difficult time establishing a compelling state interest 
that would outweigh the protection of privacy rights. A legitimate 
aim of the state would include, for instance, protecting national se-
curity, preventing and investigating crime, encouraging innovation 
and the spread of knowledge, and/or preventing the dissipation of 
social welfare benefits.207 While these state interests are of im-
portance, a constitutionally protected right should take precedence 
over such state aims.  
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While it has been argued that the Aadhaar Act violates the Indian 
Constitution under Article 14 (right to equal protection),208 Article 
19(1)(d) (right to move freely),209 Article 19(1)(g) (right to practice 
any profession, occupation, trade or business),210 and Article 21 
(right to life and personal liberty),211 the Indian Supreme Court has 
declared the Act constitutional. Article 141 of the Indian Constitu-
tion states the following: “The law declared by the Supreme Court 
shall be binding on all courts within the territory of India.”212 This 
ensures that the Supreme Court of India may pass a decree or order 
as is necessary for doing justice in any cause or matter before it, and 
any decree or order passed is enforceable throughout all of India.213  
However, despite the fact that the Supreme Court’s ruling is 
binding, Article 13(2) of the Indian Constitution may provide a legal 
mechanism to declare the Aadhaar Act unconstitutional. Article 
13(2) declares that “the State shall not make any law which takes 
away or abridges the rights conferred by [Part III (Fundamental 
Rights)] and any law made in contravention of this clause shall, to 
the extent of the contravention, be void.”214 Therefore, a law that 
enables the collection of identity data without adequate safeguards 
violates the right to privacy under Article 21 (which is included in 
Part III of the Indian Constitution) and should be declared void un-
der Article 13(2). Under this analysis, the Act should have been de-
clared unconstitutional by the Puttaswamy I court.  
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E. New Legislative Proposals  
Even though the Aadhar Act has been declared constitutional, 
there should be safeguards to the system. The portions of the Put-
taswamy I judgment that discuss data protection and privacy state 
that “any collection of personal information that would impact pri-
vacy must have a law to back it.”215 Accordingly, in order to ensure 
the success of Aadhaar, India must pass comprehensive privacy leg-
islation that provides “judicial remedies and other enforcement 
mechanisms for preventing privacy violations.”216 Considering that 
the right to privacy has been declared a protected right under the 
Indian Constitution, this task should be made easier.217 
New legislation should include the following: (1) methods for 
which individuals can object to the use of certain personal infor-
mation; (2) explanations regarding exactly how personal infor-
mation is going to be used; (3) third party oversight of UIDAI; (4) 
transparency of new developments, practices, and policies; and (5) 
prompt judicial review of situations where information was improp-
erly used or obtained. 218   
Additionally, different agencies and service providers should be 
prevented from data sharing. The interloping of data between organ-
izations would leave an electronic trail of an individual’s activities 
and records and allow information collected for one purpose to be 
used for altogether different purposes.219 For example, interlinking 
of databases could occur if, when applying for a job, an employer 
could access medical records, banking information, or voter regis-
tration of a potential employee. Personal data should be limited or 
kept relevant to its purpose and used to the extent necessary for that 
purpose. Finally, individuals should be able to request and obtain 
information concerning their personal data and have a means of 
challenging that data. If the challenge is successful, the data should 
be modified or erased.  
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V. IMPLICATIONS OF AN AADHAAR-LIKE SYSTEM  
IN THE UNITED STATES 
The United States has historically rejected attempts to create a 
national ID system.220 While the United States does issue Social Se-
curity numbers and stores biometric information in the criminal da-
tabase, there is no universal biometric database from which to pull 
information.221 With the growth of interconnected technology, it is 
important to address the consequences of a system like Aadhaar in 
the United States if an equivalent system were to be implemented.  
Because an Aadhaar ID is technically voluntary for privatized 
services, it is essential to consider how disclosing personal infor-
mation to a third party affects one’s privacy rights. Even though the 
Aadhaar Act provides certain safeguards,222 there are risks associ-
ated with the voluntary disclosure of information. For example, in 
United States v. Miller, it was determined that there is no reasonable 
expectation of privacy in bank records disclosed to a third party 
when done in the ordinary course of business.223 In that case, the 
government was able to gain access to the individual’s bank records 
even though they were confidential.224 Similarly, voluntarily dis-
closing information to an agency like UIDAI may waive any rea-
sonable expectation of privacy.  
While the United States government may assert that the voluntary 
disclosure of information is not protected by the Fourth Amend-
ment, one can argue that, in practice, the use of a national ID card 
may not actually be voluntary. As seen with the Aadhaar cards, the 
government can require ID cards to be mandatory in order to access 
certain welfare services or file income tax returns. When consider-
ing the services that demand an Aadhaar card, such disclosure of 
information is not voluntary in any meaningful sense of the word, 
but a requirement. Therefore, unlike the holding in Miller, the U.S. 
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government would fail in arguing that voluntarily providing infor-
mation to a third party in order to obtain an ID card should not be 
granted Fourth Amendment protections.  
If a national ID system were to be implemented in the United 
States, the government would be able to gain access to an individ-
ual’s confidential information (even the Aadhaar Act has a provision 
that allows disclosure of information in the “interest of national se-
curity”).225 Access to such information would implicate the Fourth 
Amendment, as there is a reasonable expectation of privacy when 
disclosing personal information.226 As Justice Sotomayor stated in 
United States v. Jones, “I would not assume that all information vol-
untarily disclosed to some member of the public for a limited pur-
pose is, for that reason alone, disentitled to Fourth Amendment pro-
tection.”227 The government’s use of personal information to moni-
tor someone’s actions, habits, and communication is a violation of 
the Fourth Amendment unless the Amendment’s requirements were 
satisfied, as it creates a comprehensive picture of that person’s 
life.228 
The gathering of biometric information into large databases has 
been a growing concern in the United States.229 It has been argued 
that biometric ID cards contain information so personal to one’s 
body (iris scans, facial recognition, and fingerprints), that protection 
extends beyond one’s body and to the cards, making a violation of a 
card’s information a personal privacy violation.230 In 2017, the In-
dian Supreme Court considered two writ petitions pending before it 
concerning the right to bodily autonomy, claiming the collection of 
biometric information under Aadhaar constitutes bodily intrusion 
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under Article 21.231 The petitions argued that unless there is a com-
pelling state interest, such as identifying a murder suspect or border 
control, the use of biometric information should be narrowly tailored 
and not be permitted as a “24/7 tracking system.”232 Because of the 
potential misuse of biometric information, certain states in the 
United States have enacted privacy laws protecting the collection 
and use of biometric information by companies.233 While the Fed-
eral Bureau of Investigation and Customs and Border Patrol have 
been permitted to collect and access biometric information, there has 
yet to be a nationwide collection system.234  
Data sharing is also an issue, as data commoditization has cre-
ated an entire industry around the buying and selling of personal in-
formation.235 As stated in Riley v. California (which extended 
Fourth Amendment protection to cell phones), technology allows 
individuals to carry massive amounts of data that is stored in one 
central location, such as a cell phone.236 Similarly, information that 
is gathered and stored in one centralized database and shared be-
tween agencies and service providers should also be afforded Fourth 
Amendment protections. A centralized database is similar to a cell 
phone—large amounts of information are stored in one location, 
giving the government free reign to use and explore that data. Not 
only is this information at risk in the state’s hands, but private actors 
may be able to gain access to the database via hacking, such as the 
recent reports of unauthorized access of the UIDAI system.237  
Normalization of the collection, use, and synchronization of data 
is dangerous. When citizens become accustomed to the government 
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requiring the collection of sensitive personal data, they become de-
sensitized to the experience.238 It then becomes the norm for the state 
to monitor and collect information about one’s life and preferences, 
leading to an Orwellian239 way of life where state surveillance is 
omnipresent.240 It is essential to a democratic form of government 
to allow citizens to speak their mind and dissent without fear of ret-
ribution from the state.241 If the public fears the monitoring and stor-
ing of their views, they will engage in self-censorship and be less 
likely to express a “contrarian or controversial view point.”242  
Additionally, private actors may take advantage of such a sys-
tem. For example, one wealthy neighborhood in India requires all 
labor and domestic workers to have an Aadhaar card.243 The resi-
dents felt it was a cheaper and more reliable way of controlling sur-
veillance of the neighborhood, rather than a police verification pro-
cess.244 However, allowing private actors to take on a police role 
could lead to discrimination, isolation, and profiling of minority 
groups.  
The implementation of a national ID system in the United States 
would have grave consequences to personal privacy rights. The 
Aadhaar system should serve as a lesson to the United States about 
how a purportedly “pro-poor, pro-development,” and “anti-corrup-
tion” mechanism can result in mass surveillance, mandatory enroll-
ment, and dangerous hacking.245 To maintain a liberal democratic 
society that values and upholds privacy rights, the United States 
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should avoid proposing such a system, no matter how beneficial and 
convenient it may seem.  
CONCLUSION 
In 2018, the Indian Supreme Court considered several petitions 
submitted in prior years addressing the mandatory use of Aadhaar 
and the overarching matter of citizens’ right to privacy.246 In the 
2018 Puttaswamy II judgment, the Court declared Aadhaar to be 
constitutional and ruled that Aadhaar can be a mandatory require-
ment for government services.247 However, the mandatory linkage 
of Aadhaar numbers to bank accounts and other private services is 
unconstitutional.248 If the Indian Supreme Court had stricken down 
the Aadhaar Act as an unconstitutional violation of privacy rights, 
the Act might have been amended and re-implemented with greater 
privacy protections. By the Court permitting the mandatory linkage 
of Aadhaar to government services, the program will become the 
most essential and pervasive identity proof in India—the one num-
ber that connects citizens and residents to all governmental agen-
cies.249 While Aadhaar may create a more efficient distribution of 
services, it also exposes a vast number of Indians to cybercrime and 
potential privacy violations.250  
However, considering that most Indians have already registered 
for Aadhaar,251 the government may continue to incentivize 
Aadhaar linkages by creating persuasive and innovative ways to en-
courage the voluntary linkage of Aadhaar identities to private 
schemes. Even if this is the case, universal Aadhaar participation 
would not be the grimmest outcome (considering the benefits that 
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Aadhaar does provide),252 as long as there are efficient and reliable 
privacy measures to protect identity information and prevent mass 
surveillance by the Indian government.   
The Indian Supreme Court’s analysis of the right to privacy in 
the Indian Constitution is one step toward the implementation of 
more specific and enforceable privacy laws in India. Having a flex-
ible and resilient interpretation of the Indian Constitution will allow 
future generations to address the concerns of a system such as 
Aadhaar. As rapid technological growth may render obsolete many 
present notions of privacy and security, laws must be able to evolve 
with the necessities and concerns of the time.  
The Aadhaar system is fast becoming mandatory for government 
services in India for citizens and noncitizen residents alike. Com-
munity and government leaders can and should demand effective 
data privacy legislation to prevent the Orwellian253 outcome of mass 
surveillance, data collection, and state intrusion. As more and more 
citizens become conditioned to accepting state intrusion into their 
lives, they run the risk of normalizing government data collection 
for possibly unconstitutional purposes.254 Therefore, effective legis-
lative solutions should include third-party oversight, judicial review, 
and transparent disclosures of information distribution.  
These core elements of privacy will—at minimum—remove in-
centives to impose even more personally invasive methods of data 
collection and monitoring. This visceral loss of privacy weakens au-
tonomy, leads to greater self-censorship, and increases risks for 
identity theft, profiling, and discrimination.255 Losing privacy pro-
tections implicates cores values enshrined in the Constitutions of In-
dia and the United States. Hopefully, the United States will gain in-
sight from the Aadhaar decisions in India and, if the United States 
does decide to implement a similar system, it should do so with pri-
vacy protections in mind. 
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